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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper analyses the link between the autonomy according to business function and the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries in Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia. The 
novelty of the paper is in the deeper investigation of the multidimensionality of autonomy. Using 
the method of principal components, four business function factors relating to autonomy were 
obtained (technology, marketing, management, finance). The results supported the argument that 
the relationship between autonomy and performance depends on the type of autonomy. 
Marketing and finance are the most powerful dimensions of autonomy. Higher autonomy in 
marketing is negatively linked with technology upgrading, measured by productivity level, 
improvement of technological level of production equipment, and quality of products. The higher 
the financial autonomy of the subsidiaries the bigger the positive changes in all fields of 
performance. 
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Introduction 
Integration of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European Union has 
accelerated the process of integration of firms from these countries into international production 
and technological networks. Their foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a significant role in 
this process and their involvement in the creation of subsidiaries in host countries was 
accompanied by the transfer of knowledge and material assets.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the link between the autonomy according to business 
functions and the performance indicators of subsidiaries of multinational companies in five CEE 
countries. In addition, country-, industry- and firm-specific variables will be used as control 
variables. The research questions presented in the paper are based on the literature that focuses 
on subsidiary development and the link between subsidiary autonomy and performance 
indicators. The empirical analysis of the paper is based on a survey carried out in 433 firms from 
five CEE countries under the European Union’s Fifth Framework Project “EU Integration and 
the Prospects for Catch-Up Development in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC): 
The Determinants of the Productivity Gap”.  
This paper is structured as follows: the first section deals with the theoretical framework, 
including the development of the research hypotheses. In the second section, the research method 
and data are described. This is followed, in the third section, by the empirical analyses of the 
autonomy of subsidiaries using principal component factor analysis. In the last section of the 
paper the link between various performance indicators, measured by the growth of productivity 
and export shares, improvements in the technological level of production equipment and product 
quality, and different dimensions of the autonomy of subsidiaries are analyzed. As control 
variables, country-, industry- and firm-specific variables (size, ownership, year of establishment 
as foreign investment enterprise) were also used. Finally, conclusions about the impact of 
autonomy on the performance of subsidiaries are drawn and in the last section implications and 
future research plans are discussed.  
 
 
   3
1. Theoretical framework  
Autonomy and the role of subsidiaries in the development of MNCs  
There exists a substantial body of literature concerned with various aspects of multinational 
subsidiary management (for example Birkinshaw et al., 1995; Poynter et al., 1985; Roth et al., 
1992; Taggart, 1997). According to Paterson and Brock (2002), research on subsidiaries has 
evolved over time. The focus in the beginning was on structure and strategy; the research later 
became concerned with headquarter-subsidiary relationships and subsidiary roles. Recently 
researchers have been increasingly interested in the subsidiary itself, its capacities and 
development. Following Birkinshaw (1997), the (foreign) subsidiary
4 is defined here as an 
operational unit controlled by the MNC and situated outside the home country. Two distinct 
views of the role of the subsidiary could be discerned: the first approach involves the role for the 
subsidiary assigned by the parent MNC; another approach is that the role may be assumed 
through the subsidiary’s own behaviour (Birkinshaw, 2000). Referring to Taggart (1997), 
autonomy may be regarded as a decision-based process that evolves through bargaining between 
centre and periphery in an organization. Thus, the autonomy of the subsidiary lies in its position 
in relation to the parent company across all business activities. A simpler definition has given by 
Björkman (2003), who defines subsidiary autonomy in the context of an MNC as the extent to 
which decision-making is taking place in the subsidiary without interference from the 
headquarters. 
Previous studies have attempted to explain variations in subsidiary autonomy, which can be 
divided into: MNC characteristics, subsidiary characteristics and environmental factors (see 
Björkman 2003). Usually, the studies on MNC characteristics look at the size of the MNC and 
the effect of parent nationality on the subsidiary. The results for the impact of MNC 
characteristics have been mixed and there is no clear understanding about it. On the other hand 
the studies on subsidiary characteristics are richer and show a little more consistency than those 
on MNC characteristics. The most recent literature overview and discussion about gaps in 
research in this area has been given by Young and Tavares (2004). Much less has been analyzed 
concerning the impact of environmental factors on autonomy, especially the host country role in 
providing opportunities for the subsidiary to develop external networks and increase autonomy 
                                                           
4 All subsidiaries treated in this paper are foreign subsidiaries, so the “foreign” term will not be used.   4
through capability-building. In the following theoretical part, only some of the most important 
factors influencing the autonomy of a subsidiary will be discussed and hypotheses for the 
empirical research established.   
 
Subsidiary development and creation of firm-specific advantages 
Subsidiary initiative or development has been a major research area in this general field 
(Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). Subsidiary initiative is ‘undertaken with a view to 
expanding the subsidiary’s scope of responsibility’ (Birkinshaw, 2000: 8). The final aim of 
subsidiary development is to build subsidiary-specific advantages, which may involve 
production-related assets like technological, productive or marketing know-how, or be associated 
with the organizational capability to co-ordinate and control efficiently the MNC’s asset base 
(Rugman et al., 2001). 
In the process of subsidiary development different roles can be taken on in order to create and 
leverage their firm’s specific advantages. It is important for the multinational to determine the 
proper combination of centralization and autonomy under which foreign subsidiaries could 
maximize their value-creating roles (Hewett et al., 2003). In earlier works, Birkinshaw (1996; 
1997) identified several forms of subsidiary initiative – local, internal, global and hybrid market 
initiatives – and also indicated conditions for these to be executed. According to Birkinshaw high 
autonomy appeared important for local and global market initiatives, but low autonomy was 
associated with internal market and hybrid initiatives. High parent-subsidiary communication 
was associated with internal market and hybrid initiatives, while the reverse was true of local and 
global market initiatives.  
The following Figure 1 describes the general framework of subsidiary development, creation of 
firm-specific advantages and links with performance. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998b) identified 
three interacting drivers of subsidiary evolution and capability creation: head-office assignment, 
subsidiary choice and local environment determinism. Later associations were more precisely 
identified with subsidiary initiatives derived from subsidiary management factors (leadership and 
entrepreneurial culture), parent-subsidiary relationships (subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary-
parent communication) and the business environment (local competition and industry   5
globalization). Several authors tried also to determine links between subsidiary initiative and 
specialized resources (see Andersson et al., 2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001).  
Subsidiary initiative is closely linked with power creation and autonomy. Power is something 
that can be given (assigned by delegation) or taken. The power can be gained by having ability or 
a capability or by possessing something with which it is possible to control somebody else. Firms 
differ in their ability to accumulate competencies and capabilities which are rare, valuable, non-
substitutable and difficult to imitate. Abilities and capabilities can be acquired and lost over time 
and hence power is a dynamic concept (Björkman, 2003).  
A subsidiary that is important to the MNC as a whole will have the potential to negotiate more 
with the headquarters than subsidiaries of lesser importance. Hence using its negotiating power 
the important subsidiary could be more autonomous than its less important counterparts. 
Furthermore, continuing the argument, subsidiaries that are able to outperform their corporate 
and local counterparts might have a higher degree of negotiating power than counterparts with 
weaker performance. The reason for this is that the MNC as a whole will be, at least to some 
degree, more dependent upon the well-performing subsidiary for its performance. The better the 
subsidiary is performing in comparison to other corporate units and local counterparts, the higher 
its autonomy will be. But for our framework this result is too general as we would like to resolve 
hypotheses about the connection between different dimensions of autonomy and performance.    6
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Figure 1.  The framework of subsidiary development and performance (using ideas from 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Rugman, 2001; Paterson and Brock, 2002) 
 
In the process of subsidiary development a central role is played by absorptive capacity creation 
and realization. In the seminal work of Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity was 
defined as the ability to recognize the value of new external information, assimilate and 
commercialize it. They stressed that such a capacity is something that develops over time, is 
path-dependent and therefore builds on prior knowledge of the capacity of other organizations. 
This ability is assumed to be crucial for the firm’s competitive advantage. Firms learn from other 
firms, and the efficiency of such a learning process is dependent on the characteristics of the 
relationships the focal organization has with other organizations (Andersson et al., 2001). 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) distinguished two types of learning among organizations. Passive 
learning means acquiring objective and observable facts of the other firm’s capability. This 
learning occurs at arm’s-length and only the most visible parts of another firm’s knowledge can   7
be acquired. Active learning means also acquiring tacit knowledge, embedded in a firm’s social 
context and therefore also more difficult to imitate by others. From that Andersson et al. (2001) 
concluded that: “if we assume that acquiring of tacit, non-imitable knowledge is crucial for a 
firm’s competitive advantage, we can state that the quality of the relationships with other firms 
are of decisive importance. In order to be competitive, the firm needs at least some links with 
other organizations, which are more important than other links in terms of the characteristics 
above.” This outcome had actually been mentioned already in earlier works. For example, Gupta 
and Govindarajan (2000) found that the absorptive capacity of the receiving unit is the most 
significant determinant of internal knowledge transfer in the MNC.  
Consequently when subsidiaries differ in their absorptive capacity, this affects the level of 
knowledge transfer, not only from the mother company but also from other MNC units. In paper 
by Mahnke et al. (2003) the link between higher absorptive capacity and growth of knowledge 
flows was analysed. In contrast to prior empirical studies, they were interested in intra-firm 
knowledge flows between MNC subsidiaries. Accordingly they conceptualized a subsidiary’s 
absorptive capacity and developed measures to capture the ability and motivation of employees 
to learn from other units in the MNC.  
Further interest was to discover more deeply the process of the absorptive capacity building. An 
interesting paper by Minbaeva et al. (2001) suggested that absorptive capacity should be 
conceptualized as being comprised of two dimensions—ability and motivation. Further, their 
results indicated that the interaction of ability and motivation significantly facilitated transfer of 
knowledge from other parts of the MNC.  
Consequently in order to create absorptive capacity of subsidiary both sides are needed – 
motivation and ability. The motivation is closely linked with the role assigned to the subsidiary 
in the corporate network. On the other hand the ability itself is critically dependent on the 
environment in which the subsidiary is located (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). In Figure 1 this 
dimension is marked as the external link between subsidiary and environment. Therefore 
analysis of environmental parameters (market growth, sophistication of national innovation 
system, quality of local managers, etc.) plays an important role in the process of opening the 
potential for the capacity-building process of subsidiaries.    8
From the previous discussion we could reach the conclusion that the growth of the absorptive 
capacity of the subsidiary increases the knowledge inflows and helps to create firm-specific 
advantages which are reflected in better performance indicators (productivity, product quality, 
export propensity).  
 
Corporate and external networks and technological autonomy of subsidiaries  
In order to formulate the research hypotheses we have to figure out the mechanism by which 
autonomy and capacity building are connected. This requires discussion of the link between 
subsidiary capacity development and the concept of embeddedness, which was initially used by 
sociologists (Granovetter, 1985). The major idea of the concept is emphasising that economic 
transactions between two actors are embedded in a social and cultural context. This concept has 
been used intensively in discussions about the link between the environment and subsidiary-
headquarters relationships in MNCs (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Andersson et al., 2001). 
The link between the embeddedness and the absorptive capacity of the subsidiary was implied by 
Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) notions, that such a capacity develops over time, is path-
dependent and therefore builds on prior knowledge of the other organization’s capacity. An 
excellent overview of the literature using the embeddedness concept in this area was presented in 
Andersson et al. (2001). 
Using the concept of embeddedness, Andersson and Forsgren (1996) distinguished between 
external and corporate networks and relationships. They showed that the more embedded the 
subsidiary was within its external relationships via local demand, sourcing and links with the 
local system of innovation, the lower was the control from the MNC. On the other hand a 
stronger embeddedness within corporate relationships suggested greater MNC control over the 
subsidiary (see for example the results of Hedlund, 1981; Garnier, 1982; Harzing, 1999). This 
was found to be especially so in the case of the technological embeddedness of the subsidiary as 
this provides the subsidiary with external, tacit knowledge about new technology, and this in turn 
was found to be a key factor for the growth and creation of firm-specific advantages. In their 
work Andersson et al. (2001) established the hypothesis that technological embeddedness is 
positively related to the subsidiary’s market performance and organizational performance. 
Market performance was defined as the performance in the marketplace where the subsidiary 
competes with all other companies, while organizational performance is that in the political   9
process inside the MNC, where the subsidiary aims to influence strategic decisions of relevance 
for the subsidiary. These analyses supported their hypothesis according to which the subsidiary’s 
technological embeddedness is positively related to its market performance. Interestingly good 
market performance by subsidiaries did not lead to a high level of organizational performance.  
Combining the results from the preceding literature discussion about the high level of 
technological embeddedness requiring a relatively high autonomy of the subsidiary allows us to 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: High autonomy of the subsidiary in technology indicates a strong 
technological embeddedness and is positively related to economic performance  
 
Autonomy in marketing and performance 
Marketing activities are another important area where corporate networks play an important role. 
The coordination of roles between headquarters and subsidiaries in marketing activities within 
MNCs is not deeply analyzed. Garnier (1982) and Harzing (1999) established that local market-
oriented subsidiaries tend to have greater autonomy. This was explained by the need of MNCs to 
adapt their marketing to local market needs, which requires flexibility and greater autonomy of 
the subsidiaries. Taggart and Hood (1999) found that globally integrated subsidiaries tend to 
have low autonomy, and a significant negative link was found between export propensity and 
autonomy of the subsidiary. This outcome is in line with the results of Holm and Pedersen 
(2000) who claimed that an increasing role of corporate internal links would reduce the 
autonomy of the subsidiary (from Young, 2004, p.221). 
In a recent paper, Hewett et al. (2003) set the goal of establishing the extent to which conditions 
internal and external to the subsidiary affect the relationship between these roles in marketing 
activities, and how that is related to product performance. Their findings suggested that the more 
closely headquarters and subsidiary roles in marketing activities are aligned with relational, 
industry and market conditions, the greater the market share tends to be. In other words they 
concluded that the more embedded is the subsidiary in external networks, the better is the 
performance. On the other hand this means that the more the firm is integrated into corporate 
export networks, the lower is the autonomy. From that a further conclusion is that the higher is   10
the market autonomy the lower should be the subsidiaries’ propensity to export. Based on that, 
the following hypothesis was proposed: 
Hypothesis 2:  A higher autonomy in marketing is reflected in a lower level of export 
propensity of the subsidiary 
 
Subsidiary autonomy across business functions 
The autonomy of subsidiaries according to business functions is a rather complicated area of 
research, which has produced conflicting views (see for detailed discussion Björkman, 2003). 
Hedlund (1981) stressed the idea that headquarters centralize issues of a strategic nature and 
leave operational issues in the hands of the subsidiary. More specifically, Hedlund found that 
finance is the most strategic issue, while most operational issues are about organization and 
personnel. A similar point had been made earlier by Garnier, Osborn, Galicia and Lecon (1979), 
but in addition they discovered that subsidiary autonomy tends to be highest in marketing issues. 
Results from the Young et al. (1985) study of 152 foreign subsidiaries in the UK indicated that 
decision areas that were most centralized were primarily financial (target ROI, dividend and 
royalty policies), together with marketing decisions concerning markets supplied and entering 
new foreign markets, and R&D and technology choices.  
Edwards, Ahmad and Moss (2002) explained this outcome rather convincingly by stating that 
integrated issues are highly centralized whereas locally responsive issues are more decentralized. 
Financial issues are highly integrated and relevant to the whole MNC. Marketing is often 
directed towards the local market and hence marketing issues could be decentralized. Personnel 
management is dependent on local legislation and consequently requires local operation, which 
gives higher autonomy to the subsidiary in these matters. Several other authors like Martinez and 
Jarillo (1991) and Harzing (1999) discovered that local market-oriented subsidiaries tend to have 
greater autonomy. In general subsidiaries have greater autonomy over decisions where they have 
superior information. 
The conclusion drawn from the preceding discussion is that the functional autonomy of 
subsidiaries is lowest in strategic issues like finance and highest in operational areas including 
domestic marketing and personnel management. Consequently if the subsidiary has reached a 
power position in the MNC, where it has obtained high autonomy in strategic issues like finance,   11
the subsidiary should have strong subsidiary-specific advantages and perform better than its 
counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3: Subsidiaries with high autonomy in strategic areas (finance, strategic 
management) have better economic performance 
Environment is another important factor that plays a role in the creation of the capabilities of 
subsidiaries and allows obtaining subsidiary-specific advantages. The literature shows that the 
more developed is the country in which the subsidiary is located, in the sense of demand, 
existence of potential sourcing partners and level of the national innovation system, the higher is 
the likelihood that the subsidiary could develop an extensive external network, improve different 
capacities, and finally gain more autonomy.  
The majority of papers on the subject deal with the development of subsidiaries and their links 
with headquarters in the advanced market economies. Significantly less research has been 
undertaken into the subsidiaries of MNCs that are operating in emerging economies and in 
transition economies. On the other hand the emerging and transforming markets are 
economically fast-growing and structurally volatile. Consequently the external networks of 
subsidiaries in these countries are quickly changing, providing bases for much more rapid change 
in the capacities and also in their role in internal (corporate) networks (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
This is especially true where the MNC internal network mainly consists of subsidiaries that are 
located in countries with a stable economic environment. 
According to this approach we may assume that those Central and East European countries that 
started the transition process earlier (e.g. Hungary, Slovenia) succeeded in providing more 
opportunities for subsidiaries to create external networks and they should have more autonomous 
subsidiaries than those countries that started transition later (for instance Estonia and Slovakia). 
In the framework of our analysis this allows advancing the following hypothesis about the 
country level effect on autonomy: 
Hypothesis 4: Subsidiaries located in the less developed transition countries have limited 
opportunities to develop extensive external networks and therefore possess a lower level of 
autonomy than in more developed countries   12
In the high-technology industries, corporate or internal embeddedness in the forms of intense, 
close and frequent relationships with suppliers, customers and R&D units might be expected to 
play a more important role than in low-technology industries. If this were the case, it would be 
logical to predict that in these industries the autonomy of subsidiaries is smaller. But based on 
the literature we may assume that the behaviour of high-tech subsidiaries in industrialized 
developed countries and in the transition countries may differ. Birkinshaw and Hood (2000) 
found surprisingly that subsidiaries of leading-edge industries located in industrialized countries 
were more autonomous and highly embedded in the local cluster than subsidiaries in other 
industrial sectors. But a rather different result was obtained in earlier work by Garnier (1982), 
who found that US subsidiaries located in Mexico were more autonomous than their counterparts 
in France. Furthermore, he found that different factors affected subsidiary autonomy in those 
countries. The major factor affecting subsidiary autonomy in France was the degree of 
integration into the corporate network. It turned out that high cooperation especially in the area 
of technology caused low autonomy in France. The high autonomy of Mexican affiliates 
indicated a much lower level of cooperation in the technology area. 
This outcome could be explained by the strategy of MNCs to encourage subsidiaries to use 
knowledge flows from the rich host country environment in developed national innovation 
systems. But we assume that in the transition countries with relatively weak national innovation 
systems the knowledge acquisition of local subsidiaries from external networks is much more 
complicated. Based on previous discussion the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5: Subsidiaries from high-tech industries located in transition countries are 
more closely engaged in corporate networks and have lower autonomy than subsidiaries in 
low-tech industries  
 
Autonomy and the size of MNC and subsidiary 
The impact of the size of the MNC on the autonomy of subsidiaries has produced mixed results. 
Garnier (1982) found that the headquarters of large MNCs tend to give less autonomy to 
subsidiaries. More detailed analyses were executed by Gates and Egelhoff (1986), who found 
that a large MNC tends to grant less autonomy to subsidiaries in marketing issues, but more in 
financial issues.    13
On the other hand the size of the subsidiary might have a curvilinear (Hedlund, 1981) or a mixed 
(Young et al., 1985; Gates and Egelhoff, 1986) effect on subsidiary autonomy. In the former 
case the subsidiary has a lower level of autonomy at its foundation, then gains autonomy until a 
certain size and afterwards starts to lose autonomy again. Young et al. (1985) found that 
autonomy was lower in large subsidiaries and those with significant levels of exports to other 
group facilities. Gates and Egelhoff (1986) discovered that a subsidiary tends to gain 
manufacturing autonomy but lose marketing autonomy as it matures. In addition, they found that 
subsidiary age was positively related to its autonomy. However, Garnier (1982) found little 
support for age and size.  
Hypothesis 6: More autonomous subsidiaries are to be found among large firms compared 
to small and medium-sized firms 
 
2. Research method  
Sample description and representativeness 
The following analysis is based on the database created as the result of work on the EU Fifth 
Framework Project: “EU Integration and the Prospects for Catch-Up Development in Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs): The Determinants of the Productivity Gap”. A special 
questionnaire for Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIEs) was undertaken in 2001-2002. The 
target group was manufacturing enterprises with foreign ownership in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. The return rate was 19.7% or 433 questionnaires. The biggest number of 
responses (35.5% of the total) came from Poland, followed by Hungary with 18%, Slovakia 
16.6%, Slovenia 16.6% and Estonia 11.5%. By industries, the biggest share in the total sample of 
responses was in the electrical and optical equipment branch (16.4% of the total), followed by 
metals and metal products (14.1%), food, beverages and tobacco (10.2%), non-metal mineral 
products (9.0%), chemicals and man-made fibres (8.5%), rubber and plastic products (6.9%), 
clothing and textiles (6.5%). Of all firms in the sample only 14.5% are minority foreign-owned 
(see detailed information about the sample in Männik et al., 2004). 
The representativeness of the sample was analyzed according to size, ownership and industry 
position. Distribution of the firms by size is rather well balanced (see the comparative tables and   14
detailed explanations in Männik et al., 2004). Only the structures of Polish and Hungarian 
sample differ from other countries. The share of firms with more than 500 employees is around 
25% in both countries. Small firms with less than 100 employees prevail in Estonia: the size of a 
country obviously has a major role in firm size. A comparison of mean ranks of the number of 
employees in the sample of FIEs by using the Mann-Whitney test (see Majcen et al., 2003) 
shows statistically significant differences of individual countries from the total sample average in 
the case of Slovenia and Hungary. Slovenian firms are significantly smaller and Hungarian firms 
significantly larger than total sample firms. A comparison of manufacturing sectors shows a 
significantly higher than average number of employees per company only in food, beverages and 
tobacco and transport equipment. In all other manufacturing sectors there are no statistically 
significant differences in the number of employees. 
The sample is also quite well balanced by the distribution between industries and by the share of 
foreign ownership (see Table 4 in Männik et al., 2004). Poland is most strongly represented both 
in number of firms and in employment, which is in accordance with the high share of Poland in 
the total stock of FDI in manufacturing. Slovenia and Estonia are moderately over-represented 
and Hungary slightly under-represented. In addition representativeness could also be evaluated 
by comparing the number of firms included in the sample with the total number of firms with 
FDI in individual countries. From that point of view, sample firms represent 4.9% of all FIEs in 
the analyzed countries. The highest share (23.8%) is in Slovenia, followed by Estonia with 
12.4%, Poland with 3.5% and Hungary with 2.1%.  
As the following analysis also requires some proxy for the development level of these five 
sample countries and differences between the types of the industry sectors (see the explanation in 
the next section), the value-added (as a % of total value-added in Table 1) and the productivity 
level is shown by country and by industry group (see Table 2). The structure of manufacturing 
industries of the countries analyzed in the paper is very different. The role of high-tech industries 
in producing manufacturing value-added varies from 9.6% in Slovenia down to 1.8% in Estonia 
and 1.6% in Slovakia. At the other end, the low-tech sectors were contributing 58% of value-
added in Estonia or 44% in Poland. The structure of value-added in the manufacturing sectors in 
Slovenia and Hungary are much more like that of the EU15 than for the other three countries.   15
 
Table 1 
 
The role of industrial sectors in the creation of the total manufacturing value-added  
(as a % of total value-added)
5 
 
INDUSTRY 
GROUP 
Slovenia 
(2001) 
Hungary 
(2001) 
Slovakia 
(1999) 
Estonia 
(2001) 
Poland 
(2000) 
EU15 
(2000) 
High-Tech 9.6  8.4 1.6 1.8 2.4  13.7
Medium-high Tech  29.5  29.7 27.1 13.1 24  30.9
Medium-Low tech  25.2  26.8 20.5 21.2 29  24.4
Low tech  35.7  34 31.2 58.2 44.4  31.0
Not identified   0  1.1 19.6 5.7 0  0
TOTAL 100  100 100 100 100  100
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNIDO Statistical database 
(http://www.unido.org/geodoc.cfm?cc=POL) and Slovenian National Statistics; Eurostat 2003 
 
Table 2 presents a brief overview of the productivity of manufacturing industries of the analyzed 
countries based on the UNIDO database. It should be taken into consideration that all results are 
converted into USD. However even this comparison indicates clearly that Slovenia and Hungary 
are leading by value-added per employee in all categories of industries. The result is also in 
accord with the level of GDP per capita: Slovenian PPP-based GDP per capita was 74% of the 
EU average in 2002, Hungary 57%, Slovakia 47%, Estonia 42% and Poland 39% (Eurostat 
2003).   
Table 2 
Value-added per employee in the manufacturing industries of five accession countries (in 
USD annually) 
 
INDUSTRY 
GROUP 
Slovenia 
(2001) 
Hungary 
(2001) 
Slovakia 
(1999) 
Estonia 
(2001) 
Poland 
(2000) 
High-Tech 18849  14750  5290  6897  20508 
Medium -High Tech  23485  30446  8395  10198  13360 
Medium-Low Tech  18210  18383  8029  9746  14954 
Low Tech  15870  10128  6970  7334  12063 
TOTAL 18993  18753  7687  8263  13451 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNIDO Statistical database 
(http://www.unido.org/geodoc.cfm?cc=POL) and Slovenian National Statistics 
                                                           
5 According to OECD classification high-tech sectors involve the following industries: 24.4, 30, 32, 33, 35.3; 
medium-high-tech: 24.0-24.3, 24.5-24.7, 29, 31, 34, 35.2, 35.4-35.5; medium-low-tech: 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35.0-
35.1; low-tech: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 36, 37 (NACE industry codes, 2003 European Innovation …).   16
Interesting results are obtained from Table 2, which indicate that medium-high industries have 
much higher productivity than high-tech industries. In the case of Hungary, the difference is 2.1 
times and in Slovenia 1.2 times (a similar pattern was also found in Slovakia and Estonia). 
Poland was the only country where the high-tech sectors had the highest productivity. Another 
interesting result concerns the bigger dispersion of productivity levels between low, medium-low 
and medium-high tech industries in Slovenia and Hungary. In other countries there were only 
minor differences in productivity levels.  
The analysed countries also differed by the speed of creating themselves as attractive locations 
for FDI inflow. Slovenia enjoyed a very early inflow of FDI, as in 1990 the stock of FDI was 
already USD 666m (UNCTAD, 2004). Hungary was another country that started to attract FDI at 
an early stage, with an extremely rapid increase between 1990 and 1994, when the stock of FDI 
in Hungary increased 21 times from USD 569m up to 11919m (UNCTAD, 2004). On the other 
hand Estonia and Slovakia received their first FDI only in 1991, and rapid growth started only 
during the second half of the 1990s. 
 
Analysis method and variables 
In the current paper the autonomy of subsidiaries is measured by business functions. The survey 
asked about the decision-making processes between the local affiliate and the parent company. 
The question asked was: Which business functions are being undertaken: a) on your own only, 
(b) mainly on your own, (c) mainly by your foreign owner, or (d) by your foreign owner only? 
From the survey answers were received about 13 business functions: product development, 
process engineering, determining the product price, supply and logistics, accounting and finance 
operations, investment finance, market research, distribution and sales, after-sales services, 
advertising, marketing, operational management, and strategic management of planning. 
Answers to questions were later standardized so that 0 indicated full autonomy in decision-
making (taken on your own only) and 1 complete lack of autonomy.  
The analysis was carried out in three stages. Because the business functions used in the survey 
were closely interrelated it was necessary to use methods that allowed creating statistically 
independent factors describing the internal structure of autonomy. Therefore the first stage of 
analysis involved principal component factor analysis to group the 13 business functions.   17
Proceeding from the latter approach, we received four new statistically independent factors, 
identified as: FACTMARK – related to the following business functions: determining the   
product price, market research, distribution and sales, after-sales services, advertising, 
marketing; FACTTECH – including product development, process engineering, supply and 
logistics; FACTMAN – including operational management, strategic management or planning; 
and FACTFIN – including accounting and finance of operations, investment finance (see Table 
3).   
Table 3 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Business functions  F1 
FACTMARK
F2 
FACTTECH 
F3 
FACTMAN 
F4 
FACTFIN 
Product development  0.381  0.769  0.165 0.003 
Process engineering  0.003  0.865  0.220 0.115 
Determining product price  0.657  0.395  0.243  0.179 
Supply and logistics  0.381  0.518  0.153 0.400 
Accounting and financial operations  0.136 0.008 0.009  0.903 
Investment  finance  0.234 0.168 0.383  0.545 
Market research  0.877  0.169 0.138  0.005 
Distribution, sales  0.868  0.118 0.007  0.187 
After-sales services  0.836  0.120 0.008  0.138 
Advertising  0.875  0.152 0.215  0.144 
Marketing  0.866  0.153 0.237  0.142 
Operational management  0.007  0.248  0.794  0.259 
Strategic man. or planning  0.382  0.187  0.783  0.006 
 
At the following stage the impact of four factor components reflecting different dimensions of 
autonomy on the level of the subsidiary performance was measured by using ordered regression 
models. This model was used as it is specially designed for cases where the dependent variable is 
measured by surveys and has values which are in growing or declining order. In the survey we 
asked companies to evaluate the magnitude of the changes of four categories: share of exports, 
productivity level in production, technology level of production equipment and level of product 
quality, once the explored manufacturing companies had received foreign investment 
involvement (becoming a foreign investment enterprise). In answering the following options 
were allowed: considerable reduction, reduction, no change, increase or considerable increase 
during the examined period. Answers were scaled between 0 and 1.   18
Through the ordered regression we can finally see the impact of four different types of the 
autonomy (technology, marketing, management, financing) on the performance of subsidiaries. 
In the analysis two types of the ordered regression models were performed, of which one was 
executed only for the four factor clusters and the other included in addition control variables in 
the form of categorical variables about countries (DCOUNTRY), industry type (DACTIVITY), 
firm size (DEMPLOY), foreign ownership (DEQUITY) and the year of establishment on the 
subsidiary (DESTBL). In the following discussion the results of the latter regression models are 
presented. Where reasonable the results of the first model are commented on in parallel with 
these other results. 
Industries were grouped into four types of sectors: high-tech, medium-high-tech, and medium-
low-tech and low-tech, using the 3-digit NACE level classification of manufacturing industries 
according to OECD classification (see footnote 5). By size firms were divided into two groups: 
small and medium size enterprises (below 250), and large enterprises (250 or more employees). 
Foreign ownership was distinguished by minority (below 50%) and majority (equal to or above 
50%). The ANOVA test was performed individually for each categorical variables and a 
MANOVA test in a compound way (all variables taken into the test) across all four factors. The 
full results of the analyses are presented in the paper by Männik et al., 2004.  
 
 3. Results and discussion 
Change in productivity level in production 
We first estimate the impact of the four components of autonomy on the change in levels of 
productivity (see Table 4), technology and product quality in manufacturing companies in the 
five CEE countries. Those three performance measures could give us some significant indicators 
of the technology upgrading and innovation potential in the economies under discussion.  
Earlier the four aspects of autonomy were measured in such a way that increase of the value of 
the factor component means a reduction of autonomy. Therefore regression estimates of the 
ordered regression result should be read in the way that shows the impact of the reduction of this 
aspect of autonomy on the dependent variable. In the case of analyzing the impact of the four 
components of autonomy on the change of productivity level, only the marketing autonomy   19
component FACTMARK turned out to be statistically significant. Consequently from Table 4 
one can read that, for an increase of the FACTMARK by 1 unit (which means a reduction of 
marketing autonomy), the productivity level grows by 0.884 units. Hence there is a positive 
impact of lower marketing autonomy on the level of productivity in production (parameter 
estimate=0.884, p-value=0.077). The lower the marketing autonomy the higher the growth in 
productivity level in the foreign subsidiaries. This outcome is valid for the group of all 
subsidiaries across the five countries. Country control variables were not statistically significant 
(see DCOUNTRY in Table 4).  The result means that subsidiaries that were given high 
autonomy in marketing were actually not supported by the parent company in creating 
subsidiary-specific advantages and their technological capacity should be low. But this will be 
analyzed further by the other indicators of performance, reflecting more directly the 
technological change in subsidiaries.    20
Table 4 
Results of ordered regression (dependent variable – change in level of productivity in 
production)
6 
Parameter Estimates
-6.920 1.091 40.263 1 .000 -9.057 -4.782
-5.109 .612 69.721 1 .000 -6.308 -3.910
-2.411 .465 26.850 1 .000 -3.322 -1.499
-.261 .444 .344 1 .558 -1.132 .611
-.053 .575 .009 1 .926 -1.180 1.073
.884 .500 3.129 1 .077 -.096 1.864
-.332 .581 .327 1 .567 -1.471 .806
-.462 .605 .584 1 .445 -1.647 .723
-.082 .423 .037 1 .847 -.910 .747
.055 .414 .018 1 .894 -.756 .866
.304 .413 .542 1 .461 -.506 1.114
-.181 .413 .192 1 .662 -.989 .628
0a . . 0 . . .
-1.054 .459 5.271 1 .022 -1.954 -.154
-.410 .279 2.168 1 .141 -.956 .136
.308 .277 1.233 1 .267 -.235 .851
0a . . 0 . . .
-.754 .227 11.013 1 .001 -1.200 -.309
0a . . 0 . . .
-.757 .310 5.940 1 .015 -1.365 -.148
0a . . 0 . . .
-.543 .307 3.124 1 .077 -1.146 .059
-.197 .252 .611 1 .434 -.690 .296
0a . . 0 . . .
[V29 = .00]
[V29 = .25]
[V29 = .50]
[V29 = .75]
Threshold
FACTTECH
FACTMARK
FACTMAN
FACTFIN
[DCOUNTRY=1.00]
[DCOUNTRY=2.00]
[DCOUNTRY=3.00]
[DCOUNTRY=4.00]
[DCOUNTRY=5.00]
[DACTIVIT=1.00]
[DACTIVIT=2.00]
[DACTIVIT=3.00]
[DACTIVIT=4.00]
[DEMPLOYE=1.00]
[DEMPLOYE=2.00]
[DEQUITY=0]
[DEQUITY=1]
[DESTBL=1.00]
[DESTBL=2.00]
[DESTBL=3.00]
Location
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
Link function: Logit.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. a. 
 
From Table 4 the role of control variables on the change of the productivity level in production 
can also be distinguished. The results are given in the form of a benchmark indicator (for 
example DACTIVIT=4 or low-tech industries being compared with others). Consequently we 
could argue that subsidiaries in the high-tech sector (DACTIVIT=1) have a significantly smaller 
contribution to the growth of the productivity level compared to low-tech industry (parameter 
estimate=-1.054, p-value=0.022). We know already from the previous analysis that high-tech 
industries in CEE countries are less productive (measured by value-added, see Table 2) 
                                                           
6 Independent categorical variables for Tables 4-8: dcountry (1 – Slovenia, 2 – Poland, 3 – Hungary, 4 – Slovakia, 5 
– Estonia), dactivit (1 – high-tech industry, 2 – medium high-tech industry, 3 – medium low-tech industry, 4 – low-
tech industry), demploye (1 – SME, 2 – large firm), dequity (0 – minority foreign ownership, 1 – majority foreign 
ownership), destbl (1 – before 1990, 2 – between 1991-1995, 3 – after 1996); model fitting (chi-square 40.562, sig. 
0.000); goodness-of-fit (Pearson chi-square 1570.587, sig. 0.000).  
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compared to medium-high, medium-low or even low-tech industries (except in Poland). The 
result from the ordered regression model supports this rather surprising fact.  
Going further, large firms seem to have bigger productivity capabilities, as well as majority-
owned foreign subsidiaries and those firms with a year of registration as a foreign investment 
enterprise after 1996. Therefore, from the perspective of the host economy, the establishment of 
new foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) should be stimulated, as well as those larger in 
number of employees and foreign involvement. Concerning the year of establishment of the 
subsidiary, the productivity indicator is the only performance measure where it does show a clear 
effect.  
 
Change in technology level of production equipment 
Table 5 below shows that in terms of change in technological level of production equipment, this 
was statistically significantly affected only by marketing autonomy (FACTMARK). The lower 
the autonomy in marketing the bigger the improvement in the technology level of the production 
equipment (parameter estimate=1.173, p-value=0.018). This supports our results from the 
previous analyses and indicates that in subsidiaries with a low autonomy in marketing the whole 
technological capacity creation process is stronger. Low autonomy in marketing is associated 
with positive changes both in the technological improvement of production equipment and also 
in the productivity level. The financial and managerial autonomy of the subsidiary (FACTFIN, 
FACTMAN) affects positively the change in the technological level of production equipment, 
but it is still not statistically significant. A bigger technological autonomy (FACTTECH) affects 
negatively the change in the technological level of production equipment, but is also not 
statistically significant. This sign of the estimate fits with the discussion about the important role 
of the local environment on the technological autonomy offered by the parent company. In the 
transition countries with weakly developed national innovation systems and relatively low 
technology level competitors, high technological autonomy actually means that the subsidiary 
could not use corporate networks as channels for creating subsidiary-specific capacities in 
technology, and this ends up as a lesser improvement in performance indicators. 
Country differences do not affect the results obtained, but industry-specific features are clearly 
evident. Compared to low-tech sectors, subsidiaries in the high-tech sectors experienced lower   22
improvement in technology of production equipment (parameter estimate= -0.863, p-
value=0.057) and subsidiaries in medium-low-tech sectors experienced higher improvement in 
production technology (.459, 0.093). The result is surprising from the perspective of an expected 
bigger technological intensity in high-tech sectors in comparison with low-tech sectors. This 
means that the high-tech sector in those economies does not support rapid productivity growth, 
nor does it experience the most rapid improvements in the technologies of production. This could 
be explained by the much lower level of production technology in the low and middle-high tech 
industries, which could therefore achieve much more rapid growth in the technology of 
production over time. But it may also indicate that foreign firms have used much more new 
technology in the production of low and middle-tech products, reaping benefits of factor cost 
differentials in labor costs. Therefore they did not invest intensively in technological change in 
the high-tech industries of the analyzed countries. Another explanation could be that external 
links of subsidiaries in the technology area could be weak. The inflow of technological 
knowledge from the mother company is weak because it is taken to be a misuse of resources to 
invest in these subsidiaries in the environment of underdeveloped national innovation systems. 
As expected, the level of production technology improvement in large firms is bigger compared 
to SMEs.    23
Table 5 
Results of ordered regression (dependent variable – change in level of technology of 
production equipment)
7 
 
Parameter Estimates
-5.416 .728 55.401 1 .000 -6.842 -3.990
-1.814 .450 16.255 1 .000 -2.696 -.932
.045 .438 .011 1 .918 -.813 .904
.725 .569 1.621 1 .203 -.391 1.841
1.173 .497 5.580 1 .018 .200 2.146
-.829 .576 2.073 1 .150 -1.958 .300
-.781 .599 1.700 1 .192 -1.955 .393
-.575 .418 1.894 1 .169 -1.394 .244
.047 .409 .013 1 .908 -.755 .849
-.129 .407 .100 1 .751 -.926 .669
-.613 .409 2.251 1 .134 -1.414 .188
0a . . 0 . . .
-.863 .454 3.615 1 .057 -1.752 .027
-.095 .273 .120 1 .729 -.630 .441
.459 .274 2.815 1 .093 -.077 .995
0a . . 0 . . .
-.642 .223 8.272 1 .004 -1.080 -.205
0a . . 0 . . .
-.224 .305 .538 1 .463 -.821 .374
0a . . 0 . . .
-.264 .303 .763 1 .382 -.858 .329
.029 .248 .013 1 .908 -.457 .514
0a . . 0 . . .
[V30 = .25]
[V30 = .50]
[V30 = .75]
Threshold
FACTTECH
FACTMARK
FACTMAN
FACTFIN
[DCOUNTRY=1.00]
[DCOUNTRY=2.00]
[DCOUNTRY=3.00]
[DCOUNTRY=4.00]
[DCOUNTRY=5.00]
[DACTIVIT=1.00]
[DACTIVIT=2.00]
[DACTIVIT=3.00]
[DACTIVIT=4.00]
[DEMPLOYE=1.00]
[DEMPLOYE=2.00]
[DEQUITY=0]
[DEQUITY=1]
[DESTBL=1.00]
[DESTBL=2.00]
[DESTBL=3.00]
Location
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
Link function: Logit.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. a. 
 
Change in level of product quality 
Based on the above analysis it is not surprising to find that low marketing autonomy and high 
financing autonomy played a positive role in terms of changes in level of product quality (see 
respectively parameter estimate=1.284, p-value=0.010; -1.631, 0.007 in Table 6). The smaller 
the subsidiaries’ autonomy in marketing and the bigger the autonomy in financing, the greater 
the experienced improvement in the quality level of products. This indicates that bigger financial 
autonomy reflects a subsidiary that has already obtained a solid level of production technology 
combined with strong improvements in the quality of products. The received results also indicate 
that financial and marketing autonomy are somewhat reciprocal to each other. A higher 
autonomy in marketing indicates that the subsidiary is involved in the production of relatively 
                                                           
7 Model fitting (chi-square 30.758, sig. 0.009); goodness-of-fit (Pearson chi-square 1458.685, sig. 0.000)   24
low-tech products and the improvement of product quality, but also the production technology is 
relatively limited. On the other hand, bigger financial autonomy reflects positive improvements 
in the quality level and technology, and provides better potential for capacity growth. 
Country-specific variables were important in this case. In the country effects analyses, Estonia 
was used as the benchmark (DCOUNTRY=5 as redundant). Statistically significant conclusions 
are that in Slovenia improvement in the quality of products was weaker compared to Estonia 
(estimate -1.083). This difference between Slovenia and Estonia could be explained by 
differences in the development level of the two countries reflected in the different starting 
position of subsidiaries as foreign-owned firms. In Slovenia the general economic development 
level and also productivity level were much higher than in Estonia in the early and mid nineties.  
Similarly to previous results medium-low-tech firms have contributed more to the level of 
quality of products compared to other industry sectors, as well as large foreign subsidiaries.    25
 Table 6 
Results of ordered regression (dependent variable – change in level of quality of product)
8 
Parameter Estimates
-6.781 1.097 38.186 1 .000 -8.932 -4.630
-1.998 .454 19.394 1 .000 -2.887 -1.109
-.224 .440 .261 1 .610 -1.086 .637
.550 .569 .933 1 .334 -.566 1.665
1.284 .501 6.582 1 .010 .303 2.265
-.781 .579 1.822 1 .177 -1.915 .353
-1.631 .605 7.264 1 .007 -2.818 -.445
-1.083 .421 6.599 1 .010 -1.908 -.257
.089 .410 .047 1 .829 -.715 .892
-.632 .407 2.417 1 .120 -1.429 .165
-.227 .411 .304 1 .581 -1.032 .578
0a . . 0 . . .
-.684 .453 2.280 1 .131 -1.572 .204
-.002 .274 .000 1 .995 -.538 .535
.452 .274 2.725 1 .099 -.085 .989
0a . . 0 . . .
-.485 .224 4.693 1 .030 -.924 -.046
0a . . 0 . . .
-.217 .306 .503 1 .478 -.817 .383
0a . . 0 . . .
-.360 .303 1.412 1 .235 -.955 .234
.013 .249 .003 1 .957 -.475 .501
0a . . 0 . . .
[V31 = .3]
[V31 = .5]
[V31 = .8]
Threshold
FACTTECH
FACTMARK
FACTMAN
FACTFIN
[DCOUNTRY=1.00]
[DCOUNTRY=2.00]
[DCOUNTRY=3.00]
[DCOUNTRY=4.00]
[DCOUNTRY=5.00]
[DACTIVIT=1.00]
[DACTIVIT=2.00]
[DACTIVIT=3.00]
[DACTIVIT=4.00]
[DEMPLOYE=1.00]
[DEMPLOYE=2.00]
[DEQUITY=0]
[DEQUITY=1]
[DESTBL=1.00]
[DESTBL=2.00]
[DESTBL=3.00]
Location
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
Link function: Logit.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. a. 
 
 
Change in export orientation 
Finally we turn attention to the effects of autonomy on the change in export orientation, 
measured as the change in the share of exports from output (see Table 7). We can clearly see the 
differences in autonomy categories. The smaller the marketing autonomy in CEE countries the 
bigger the growth of export orientation (parameter estimate=2.306, p-value=0.000). This shows 
clearly that in countries where local subsidiaries were given high autonomy they were mainly 
oriented toward the domestic market. On the other hand in countries where the local subsidiaries 
were given less autonomy the export orientation was higher and growing much more rapidly than 
in high marketing autonomy countries (especially in Poland). The opposite result is received for 
financing autonomy. Greater autonomy in financing has provided a bigger positive change in the 
growth of export orientation in the examined countries (-1.109, 0.066). Therefore, high financing 
                                                           
8 Model fitting (chi-square 35.937, sig. 0.002); goodness-of-fit (Pearson chi-square 935.383, sig. 0.983)   26
autonomy is beneficial in terms of export orientation growth. If we do not take into account 
country-, industry- or firm-specific features (running the ordered regression only for factor 
clusters) then we could also see that higher technology autonomy in subsidiaries had contributed 
more significantly to increase in the share of exports (-1.097, 0.039). Low mandates in marketing 
and high mandates in financing or in the technology area are then having positive effects on 
export orientation in the five CEE countries.  
Table 7 
Results of ordered regression (dependent variable – share of exports)
9 
 
Parameter Estimates
-4.736 .583 66.043 1 .000 -5.878 -3.594
-3.102 .475 42.637 1 .000 -4.033 -2.171
-1.137 .442 6.631 1 .010 -2.003 -.272
.058 .437 .018 1 .894 -.799 .915
-.812 .571 2.023 1 .155 -1.930 .307
2.306 .519 19.774 1 .000 1.290 3.322
-.104 .579 .032 1 .858 -1.239 1.032
-1.109 .604 3.375 1 .066 -2.292 .074
-.036 .418 .007 1 .932 -.856 .784
-.835 .407 4.219 1 .040 -1.632 -.038
-.858 .406 4.472 1 .034 -1.653 -.063
.179 .417 .185 1 .667 -.638 .997
0a . . 0 . . .
.472 .464 1.031 1 .310 -.438 1.382
.327 .275 1.416 1 .234 -.212 .866
.617 .273 5.105 1 .024 .082 1.153
0a . . 0 . . .
-1.004 .229 19.170 1 .000 -1.453 -.555
0a . . 0 . . .
-.434 .300 2.094 1 .148 -1.023 .154
0a . . 0 . . .
.253 .302 .704 1 .402 -.339 .846
.210 .251 .701 1 .403 -.282 .702
0a . . 0 . . .
[V28 = .00]
[V28 = .25]
[V28 = .50]
[V28 = .75]
Threshold
FACTTECH
FACTMARK
FACTMAN
FACTFIN
[DCOUNTRY=1.00]
[DCOUNTRY=2.00]
[DCOUNTRY=3.00]
[DCOUNTRY=4.00]
[DCOUNTRY=5.00]
[DACTIVIT=1.00]
[DACTIVIT=2.00]
[DACTIVIT=3.00]
[DACTIVIT=4.00]
[DEMPLOYE=1.00]
[DEMPLOYE=2.00]
[DEQUITY=0]
[DEQUITY=1]
[DESTBL=1.00]
[DESTBL=2.00]
[DESTBL=3.00]
Location
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
Link function: Logit.
This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. a. 
 
Looking at the country characteristics, there is seen to be a smaller change in export orientation 
in subsidiaries in Poland (parameter estimate=-0.835, p-value=0.040) and in Hungary (-0.858, 
0.034) in comparison with Estonia. Next, subsidiaries from the medium-low-tech industry sector 
have had bigger changes in export share compared to counterparts in low-tech (0.617, 0.024) or 
                                                           
9 Model fitting (chi-square 76.524, sig. 0.000); goodness-of-fit (Pearson chi-square 1389.638, sig. 0.460)   27
even medium-high-tech and high-tech industries. And finally, SMEs had lower growth in export 
orientation in relation to large firms (-1.004, 0.000).  
Taking change in export orientation as the focus, we could clearly show the diversities of the 
four types of the autonomy and how they influence the performance of subsidiaries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. From the perspective of the host country, bigger marketing autonomy (as in 
Polish subsidiaries) decreases the growth of export orientation, bigger financing and technology 
autonomy increases the growth of export orientation. Larger domestic markets (like in Poland 
and Hungary) might not stimulate increasing export shares in those countries, which in turn do 
not get the direct or indirect effects accompanying exports. Export to more developed countries 
could be taken as one of the factors contributing to the technological level and innovation of the 
host country.  
4. Conclusions   
The results obtained supported clearly the basic research idea concerning the heterogeneity of 
autonomy. Using the technique of component factor analyses and ordered regression we were 
able to analyze links between four dimensions of autonomy and several indicators of 
performance of the subsidiary. The results supported the argument that the relationship between 
autonomy and performance depends on the type of autonomy. Marketing and finance are the 
most powerful dimensions of autonomy that influence different aspects of the performance of 
subsidiaries. They are like two ends of autonomy from the viewpoint of their impact on 
performance.  
The higher the autonomy level in marketing activities in the five examined CEE countries the 
lower the effects either on technology upgrading (productivity level, technology level of 
production equipment and quality of produce) or on export shares. Marketing autonomy 
therefore is signaling that the subsidiary is not in a good position to create subsidiary-specific 
advantages. In addition high autonomy in marketing also indicates that the subsidiary is 
relatively domestic-market oriented and may be failing to learn from the export process. .  
The second most powerful autonomy type is financing. The analysis shows that the higher the 
financing autonomy of the foreign subsidiaries the bigger the positive changes in all fields of 
performance (productivity level, export orientation, technology and product quality   28
improvements). Technological autonomy played a negative role on the performance of 
subsidiaries and shows how important it is to maintain deep corporate links for the subsidiaries 
located in technologically underdeveloped transition countries. This result was statistically 
significant only in the case of the model without any country-, industry- or firm-specific features.  
Analyses of control variables also supported the view that the performance of subsidiaries is also 
country-, industry- and firm-dependent. Basically, majority-owned, large and medium-low-tech 
foreign subsidiaries have achieved more extensive positive effects on their performance. The 
most surprising result was obtained for the industry variable. Subsidiaries from high-tech 
industries showed significantly smaller influences on either the productivity level of production 
or the improvement of the technological level of their production equipment, as compared to 
low-tech sectors. By country, differences in size of local market, development level and starting 
position as a foreign investment enterprise affect the subsidiaries’ performance. Estonia, which is 
one of the smallest by local market, one of the less developed among the examined CEE 
countries and one receiving foreign investments later than others, has achieved more significant 
effects on export orientation compared to Poland and Hungary, and on the improvement of the 
level of product quality compared to Slovenia. The year of establishment of the firm as a foreign 
investment enterprise has not generally played a significant role in terms of the subsidiaries’ 
performance except for the productivity level in production. Subsidiaries established from 1996 
onwards compared to those created in or before 1990 have achieved larger productivity levels in 
production.     
 
5. Implications and further research 
 
The discussion of business implications of subsidiary autonomy leads us to the issue of host 
country effects of the foreign subsidiary. The higher autonomy of the subsidiary itself does not 
necessarily mean that the impact on the local economy is positive. For the host country it is much 
more important how the capacities and resources of the subsidiary are developing and how 
closely it is linked with host country industrial clusters. The host country should be interested in 
developing its national innovation system, creating human capital and using other economic 
policy tools to upgrade the business environment.   29
At the firm level, the management needs to combine the different areas of autonomy to gain 
maximally from the relation with headquarters located in some foreign country. There is the 
question of adapting appropriate tacit knowledge and also material assets to local specifications 
and of contributing to its own innovation potential (or absorptive capacities) through 
developmental work. In this development stage of the countries and firms it might be reasonable 
to have low rates of autonomy in some fields in view of shortages of specific knowledge (for 
example management in Poland) and higher rates of autonomy in selected fields with already 
appropriate tacit knowledge (for example marketing in Poland). For example in the analysed 
CEE countries a lower rate of technology autonomy is assumed to contribute more intensively to 
cooperation with the headquarters, and may also be useful to the host country.  
It can be concluded that, from the perspective of technology and knowledge transfer through 
FDI and innovation potential, neither excessive dependence on the headquarters nor complete 
autonomy from headquarters is beneficial, especially in CEE countries today. Excessive 
dependence impedes the potential for increasing its own absorptive capacity and excessive 
independence might leave the local unit in a circle of “internationally uncompetitive” 
knowledge. Therefore, depending on the shortage of requisite knowledge, the managements in 
subsidiaries should be more or less active in relationships with headquarters. The relatively low 
technology autonomy in CEE countries is supposed to contribute to the knowledge and 
technology transfer.  
Finally, turning attention to some shortcomings of the current analysis, the problems related to 
the representativeness of the countries in the sample might be noted. Poland was most strongly 
represented, Slovenia and Estonia moderately over represented and Hungary under represented. 
The results might be biased in favour of one or another country features. Secondly, in further 
research it would be reasonable also to use other measures apart from functional ones for 
estimating the autonomy in subsidiaries, taking into account the features of countries, industries 
and firms. Thirdly, it would be appropriate to relate the autonomy and/or performance of 
subsidiaries to the backward and forward linkages between foreign subsidiaries and domestic 
firms, in order to search for the existence of spillovers in the manufacturing sector in CEE 
countries.   30
References 
 
1.  Andersson, U. ‘Managing the transfer of capabilities within multinational corporations: the 
dual role of the subsidiary’. Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 19, 2003, pp. 425-
442.  
2.  Andersson, U.; Forsgren, M. ‘Subsidiary embeddedness and control in the multinational 
corporation’. International Business Review, 5(5), 1996. pp. 487-508. 
3.  Andersson, U.; Forsgren, M.; Pedersen, T. ‘The MNC as a differentiated network: 
subsidiary technology embeddedness and performance’. Uppsala University, Copenhagen 
Business School, 1999, 32 p.  
4.  Andersson, U., Forsgren, M., Pedersen, T. ‘Subsidiary performance in multinational 
corporations: the importance of technology embeddedness’. International Business Review, 
2001, 10(1), 3-23. 
5.  Bartlett, C.A.; Ghoshal, S. ‘Tap your subsidiaries for global reach’. Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 64(6), pp. 87-94.  
6.  Birkinshaw, J. ‘How multinational subsidiary mandates are gained and lost’. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 27, Issue 3, 1996, pp. 467–493. 
7.  Birkinshaw, J. ‘Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: the characteristics of 
subsidiary initiative’. Strategic Management Journal, 18(3), 1997, pp.207-229. 
8.  Birkinshaw, J. Entrepreneurship in the global firm. London: 2000, Sage Publications. 
9.  Birkinshaw, J.; Hood, N. ‘An empirical study of development processes in foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in Canada and Scotland’. Management International Review, Fourth Quarter, 
Vol. 37/4, 1997, pp. 339–364. 
10. Birkinshaw, J.; Hood, N. ‘Multinational subsidiary evolution: capability and charter 
change in foreign owned subsidiary companies’. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 
23/4, 1998, p. 773, 32 p. 
11. Birkinshaw, J.; Hood, N. ‘Characteristics of foreign subsidiaries in industry clusters’. 
Journal of International Business Studies, First Quarter 2000, 31, 1, p.141.  
12. Birkinshaw, J.; Morrison, A. ‘Configurations of strategy and structure in multinational 
subsidiaries’. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26/4, 1995, pp. 729–794. 
13. Björkman, A. ‘Subsidiary power and autonomy’. 29
th Annual EIBA Conference, 
Copenhagen, December 11-13, 2003, 25 p. 
14. Cohen, W., Levinthal, D. ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation’. Administrative Science Quarterly 1990. 
15. Edwards, M.; Ahmad, A.; Moss, S. ‘Subsidiary autonomy: the case of multinational 
subsidiaries in Malaysia’. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 33, No.1, 2002, 
pp. 183-191.  
16. European Innovation Scoreboard 2003. Technical Paper No 4: Sectoral Innovation 
Scoreboards, European Trend Chart on Innovation, European Commission, November 
2003, 60 p. 
17. Garnier, G.H. ‘Context and decision-making autonomy in the foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinational corporations’. Academy of Management Journal, 25(4), 1982, pp. 693-908 
18. Gates, S.R., Egelhoff, W.G. ‘Centralization in headquarters-subsidiary relationships’. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 17(2), 1986, pp. 71-92. 
19. Ghoshal, S., Bartlett, C.A. ‘Creation, adoption and diffusion of innovations by 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations’. Journal of International Business Studies, 19 
(3), 1988, pp. 365–388   31
20. Granovetter, M. ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’. 
American Journal of Sociology, 1985; 91(3): 481-510. 
21. Gupta, A.K; Govindarajan, V. ‘Knowledge flows and the structure of control within 
multinational corporations’. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 
1991, pp. 768-792. 
22. Gupta, A.K.; Govindarajan, V. ‘Organizing for knowledge flows within MNCs’. 
International Business Review, Vol. 3, Issue 4 , December 1994, pp. 443-457. 
23. Harzing, A.-W.K.  Managing the multinationals: an international study of control 
mechanisms. Northampton, MA: 1999, Edward Elgar. 
24. Hedlund, G. ‘Autonomy of subsidiaries and formalization of headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships in Swedish MNCs’, in L. Otterbeck (ed.) The management of headquarters-
subsidiary relationships in multinational corporations (Aldershot, Gower, 1981). 
25. Hewett, K., Roth, M.S., Roth, K. ‘Conditions influencing headquarters and foreign 
subsidiary roles in marketing activities and their effects on performance’. Journal of 
International Business Studies (2003) 34, 567–585. 
26.  Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C., Wright, M. ‘Strategy in emerging economies’. 
Academy of Management Journal, 2000,  43(3): 249–267. 
27. Hunya, G. ‘Foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe: a challenge of 
globalization and factor of stabilisation’. Club of Rome Symposium “How to Ride the 
Global Wave”, Bucharest, September 1999, 21 p. 
28. Lane, P.J.; Lubatkin, M. ‘Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 1998, 19: 461-478. 
29. Luo, Y. ‘Capability exploitation and building in a foreign market: implications for 
multinational enterprises’. Organization Science, 2002, 13(1) pp. 48–63 
30. Luo, Y. ‘Market-seeking MNEs in an emerging market: how parent–subsidiary links shape 
overseas success’. Journal of International Business Studies, 2003, 34, 290–309 
31. Majcen, B., Radosevic, S., Rojec, M. ‘FDI subsidiaries and industrial integration of 
Central Europe: conceptual and empirical results’. Working paper, Ljubljana 2003. 
32. Manhke, V.; Pedersen, T.; Verzin, M. ’The impact of knowledge management on MNC 
subsidiary performance: the role of absorptive capacity’. 29th Annual EIBA Conference, 
CBS, Dec 2003. 
33. Marin, A., Bell, M. ‘Technology spillovers from direct investment (FDI): an exploration 
of the active role of MNC subsidiaries in the case of Argentina in the 1990s’ SPRU – 
Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex. SPRU 2004. 
34. Martínez, J.I.; Jarillo, J.C. ‘Coordination demands of international strategies’. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 22 (3), 1991, pp. 429-44. 
35. Minbaeva, D., Pedersen, T., Björkman, I., Frey, C., Park, H.J. ‘MNC knowledge 
transfer, subsidiary absorptive capacity and HRM’. Working paper 14, Copenhagen 
Business School, December 2001 
36. Männik, K.; Hannula, H.; Varblane, U. ‘Country, industry and firm size effects on 
foreign subsidiary strategy: an example of five CEE countries’. University of Tartu, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Working Paper Series, No. 27, 2004, 
63 p.  
37. Paterson, S.L.; Brock, D.M. ‘The development of subsidiary management research: 
review and theoretical analysis’. International Business Review, Vol. 11, 2002, pp. 139-
163.   32
38. Poynter, T.A.; White, R.E. ‘The strategies of foreign subsidiaries: responses to 
organizational slack’. International Studies of Management and Organisations, Vol. XIV, 
No. 4, 1985, pp. 91–106. 
39. Rosenzweig, P.M.; Singh, J.V. ‘Organizational environments and the multinational 
enterprise’. Academy of Management Review, 1991, 16(2): 340–361. 
40. Roth, K.; Morrison, A. ‘Implementing global strategy: characteristics of global subsidiary 
mandates’. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 23, 1992, pp. 715–736. 
41. Rothwell, R. ‘Successful industrial innovation: critical factors for the 1990s’. R&D 
Management, Vol. 22 (3), 1992, pp. 221–238. 
42. Rugman, A.M., Verbeke, A. ‘Subsidiary specific advantages in multinational enterprises’. 
Strategic Management Review, 2001, 22(3)  
43. Scott, S.; Goldberg, M. S.; Mayo, N.E. ‘Statistical assessment of ordinal outcomes in 
comparative studies’. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, Vol. 50, 1997, pp. 45-55. 
44. Taggart, J.H. ‘Autonomy and procedural justice: a framework for evaluating subsidiary 
strategy’. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 51–77. 
45. Taggart, J.H.; Hood, N. ‘Determinants of autonomy in multinational corporations’ 
subsidiaries’. European Management Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1999, pp. 226-236.  
46. UNCTAD. Country fact sheets. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2441&lang=1 
47. UNIDO Statistical database [http://www.unido.org/geodoc.cfm?cc=POL] 
48. Young, S.; Tavares, A.T. ‘Centralization and autonomy: back to the future’. International 
Business Review, Vo.13, Number 2, 2004, pp. 215-238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  7/12/05 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 780: Autonomy and Performance of Foreign Subsidiaries in five 
Transition Countries  
Urmas Varblane, Katrin Männik, 
and Helena Hannula 
July 2005 
No. 779: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in China: The Case 
of Aircraft Manufacturing 
Andrea Goldstein  July 2005 
No. 778: Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement 
and Tacit Objectives 
Sophie Claeys, Gleb Lanine and 
Koen Schoors 
June 2005 
No. 777: Labor Market Trends and Institutions in Belarus  Zuzana Brixiova and Vera 
Volchok 
June 2005 
No. 776: Can Vietnam Achieve One of its Millennium Development 
Goals? An analysis of schooling dropouts of children 
Vo Tri Thanh And Trinh Quang 
Long 
June 2005 
No. 775: Is The Link Between Reforms And Growth Spurious? A 
Comment 
Tomasz Mickiewicz  May 2005 
No. 774: The Risk Aversion of Banks in Emerging Credit markets: 
Evidence from India 
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik and 
Jenifer Piesse 
May 2005 
No. 773: Organized Labor and Restructuring: Coal Mines in the Czech 
Republic and Romania 
Jan Bruha, Delia Ionascu, and 
Byeongju Jeong 
May 2005 
No. 772: Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the 
Yukos Affair  
Alexei Goriaev and Konstantin 
Sonin 
May 2005 
No. 771: Non-Linear Exchange Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A 
Bumpy Road Towards A Honeymoon 
Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs 
Égert, and Ronald MacDonald 
May 2005 
No. 770: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Southeastern Europe, Russia, 
Ukraine and Turkey: Healthy or (Dutch) Diseased? 
Balázs Égert  May 2005 
No. 769: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Meta-Regression Analysis 
Balázs Égert and László Halpern 
 
May 2005 
No. 768: Testing for inflation convergence between the Euro Zone 
and its CEE  partners 
Imed Drine and Christophe Rault  Apr. 2005 
No. 767: Labor Mobility during Transition: Evidence from the Czech 
Republic 
Jan Fidrmuc  Apr. 2005 
No. 766: Formation of social capital in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Understanding the gap vis-à-vis developed countries 
Jan Fidrmuc and Klarita Gërxhani  Apr. 2005 
No. 765: Do Regional Integration Agreements Increase Business-Cycle 
Convergence?  Evidence From APEC and NAFTA 
Viviana Fernandez and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Apr. 2005 
No. 764: State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study 
in the Economics of the Informal Sector 
Maxim Bouev  Apr. 2005 
No. 763: The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle Revisited: An “European-
Regional” Perspective 
Jérôme Hericourt and Mathilde 
Maurel 
Apr. 2005 
No. 762: Transatlantic Differences in Labour Markets Changes in Wage 
and Non-Employment Structures in the 1980s and the 1990s 
Patrick A. Puhani  Mar. 2005 
No. 761: Resolution, Recovery and Survival: The Evolution of Payment 
Disputes in Post-Socialist Europe 
William Pyle  Mar. 2005 
No. 760: Official Foreign Exchange Interventions in the Czech 
Republic: Did They Matter? 
Balázs Égert and Luboš Komárek  Mar. 2005 
No. 759: Assessing Market Expectations on Exchange Rates and 
Inflation: A Pilot Forecasting System for Bulgaria 
Michael Berlemann, Kalina 
Dimitrova, & Nikolay Nenovsky 
Mar. 2005 
No. 758: Attitudes and Performance: An Analysis of Russian Workers  Susan J. Linz and Anastasia 
Semykina 
Mar. 2005 
No. 757: Barter, Credit, and Welfare: A theoretical inquiry into the 
barter phenomenon in Russia 
José Noguera and Susan J. Linz 
 
Mar. 2005 
No. 756: Sorting, Selection, and Transformation of the Return to 
College Education In China 
Belton M. Fleisher, Haizheng Li, 
Shi Li, and Xiaojun Wang 
Mar. 2005 
No. 755: Foreign Exchange Interventions in Emerging Europe: 
Should We Give a Damn? The Case of Croatia and Turkey 
Balázs Égert and Maroje Lang 
 
Mar. 2005 
No. 754: Targeting Relative Inflation Forecast as Monetary Policy 
Framework for Adopting Euro 
Lucjan T. Orlowski  Feb. 2005 
 